Privatizing the English National Health Service:An Irregular Verb? by Powell, Martin & Miller, Robin
 
 
University of Birmingham
Privatizing the English National Health Service
Powell, Martin; Miller, Robin
DOI:
10.1215/03616878-2334918
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Powell, M & Miller, R 2013, 'Privatizing the English National Health Service: An Irregular Verb?', Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-2334918
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
  
Behind The Jargon  
Privatizing the English National Health Service: an irregular verb?  
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores different stakeholder perspectives of “privatization” in the 
English National Health Service (NHS).  Much of the academic literature makes 
empirical claims about privatization on the basis of absent or shaky definitions of the 
term, resulting in much of the debate on this issue largely being a “nondebate”, where 
opponents talk past rather than to each other.  We aim to throw light on privatization 
by applying the lens of the “three-dimensional” approach (ownership, finance, and 
regulation) of the mixed economy of welfare to the views of key voices within these 
debates.  These stakeholder perspectives are political (parliamentary debates), public 
(opinion polls), clinical provider (British Medical Association and Royal College of 
Nursing), and campaigning groups.  We argue that in terms of grammar, privatize 
seems to be an irregular verb:  I want more private sector involvement: you wish to 
privatize the NHS.  The term privatization is multidimensional, and definitions and 
operationalizations of the term are often implicit, unclear, and conflicting, resulting in 
conflicting accounts of the occurrence, chronology, and degree of privatization in the 
NHS.  Stakeholders have divergent interests, and they use “privatization” as a means 
to express them, resulting in a Tower of Babel.   
 
Introduction  
 
This article explores different stakeholder perspectives of ‘privatization’ in the 
English National Health Service (NHS)
1
. It is a ‘public health service’ or ‘Beveridge’ 
model which is largely publicly funded and provided (Maarse 2006), although some  
commentators regard it as an international ‘leader’ in privatization (eg Pollock 2005: 
18). Much of the academic literature also makes empirical claims about privatization 
on the basis of absent or shaky definitions of the term, perhaps believing its meaning 
to be so clear as to not need a full explanation. At one end of the spectrum there are 
narrow, ‘one dimensional’ definitions that focus on the transfer of assets. Dunleavy 
(1986: 13) defines ‘privatization’ strictly as the permanent transferring of service or 
goods production activities previously carried out by public service bureaucracies to 
private firms or to other forms of non-public organizations. Other commentators take 
a broader perspective. According to Le Grand and Robinson (1984), privatization 
involves a reduction in state activity in one of the areas of provision, subsidy and 
regulation. Young (1986) argues that seven different forms of privatization were 
identifiable in policies of the British Conservative government in the 1980’s, 
including the extension of private sector practices into the public sector and reduced 
subsidies and increased charging.  
 
Much of the debate on this issue therefore has largely been a ‘non debate’, where 
opponents talk past rather than to each other. It tends to generate more heat than light 
as definitions and operationalizations of ‘privatization’ are often implicit, unclear and 
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 Responsibility for planning and delivery of publicly funded healthcare in the UK has been 
progressively devolved to the constituent nations, meaning that in many respects there is no UK NHS 
as such but rather different NHSs in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern-Ireland 
conflicting (cf Maarse 2006), and the term tends to be a general ‘boo word’ that lacks 
definitional and analytical precision, and is often conflated with other terms such as 
‘marketisation’.  
 
Maarse (2006) examines privatization from four different perspectives: financing, 
provision, management and operations and investment. However, we provide a three 
dimensional account which examines movement between origin and destination cells 
in a 16 cell model. The basic model differentiates between state, market, voluntary 
and informal provision/ownership and finance. The third dimension, of state 
regulation, is indicated by inclusion of an H (high) and L (low). In line with the 
common elements of definitions outlined above, extreme privatization would entail 
movement from Cell 1H (i.e. state funding and provision) with high regulation 
(through hierarchical power as there would only be public sector provision) to that of 
Cell 6L (i.e. market funding and provision) with low regulation. Table 1 provides 
examples from the different periods of the NHS (see eg Keen et al 2001; Maarse 
2006; Powell 2008).  
 
We aim to throw light on privatization by applying the lens of ‘three dimensional’ 
approach of the Mixed Economy of Welfare (MEW) (Powell 2007, 2008) to the views 
of key voices within these debates.  
 
Privatization and the English NHS: Stakeholder Perspectives 
 
Political Perspectives 
 
While privatizing state assets in fields such as utilities may have been ‘official’ 
policy, no English government has ever stated that it wishes to ‘privatize the NHS’. 
However, previous Conservative (1979-97)  and Labour (1997-2010) governments 
saw a greater role for the private sector, and all major parties supported this in the 
2010 election (Timmins 2012). The contentious nature of this discussion was 
highlighted in a parliamentary debate on the new Health and Social Care Act (House 
of Commons 2012). The Labour opposition spokesperson recognised that ‘there is an 
important role for the private sector in supporting the delivery of NHS care’, but 
noted with concern plans to open up the NHS as a regulated market, encourage 
private sector involvement in both commissioning and provision of NHS services 
(Cell 2); and increase the private income cap for NHS hospitals to 49% (Cell 5). 
Describing the proposals as a break with 63 years of NHS history and a “genie out of 
the bottle” moment, he contrasted with an interpretation of the previous Labour 
government’s policy to ‘use the private sector at the margins to support the public 
NHS’. Critics argue that greater private involvement risks putting profits before the 
interests of NHS patients, stressing issues such as ‘cherry picking’ or ‘cream 
skimming’, and conflicts of interest between shareholders and patients.  
 
In response, the  government spokesperson reflected that when in power Labour had 
contracted with ‘Independent Sector Treatment Centres’ delivered by private 
companies (Cell 2), and stated that they wished  to increase the role of the private 
sector to 10% or 15% (Cell 2). From this perspective the new Bill was simply an 
‘evolution’ of previous government policy. He argued that giving patients choice of 
private or public providers did not represent a forced externalisation by the 
government as it as patients would decide, and concluded that if the values of the 
NHS remained unchanged then the NHS could not be said to have been privatised – 
‘no NHS patient pays for their care today; no patient will pay for their care in future 
under this Government’. Supporters argue that any private income earned by the NHS 
private income will be ploughed back into benefits for NHS patients.  
 
This debate highlights that there is political agreement around moving the NHS 
towards Cells 2 and 5 and therefore all parties could be ‘accused’ of privatising to 
some extent. Alleged areas of difference relate to a somewhat arbitrary and 
changeable boundary around an acceptable level and type of private involvement, and 
the extent to which a continuation of the principle of ‘free access based on clinical 
need’ results in a ‘public NHS’ (even if through patient choice clinical services are 
largely delivered by the private sector). 
 
Public Perspectives 
 
There is no doubt of the strength of public feeling in favour of the ‘principles’ of the 
NHS, but views on delivery, particularly the extent to which aims might be achieved 
through private means, are less clear (Dean 2001). Opinion polls do suggest a degree 
of concern regarding the role of the private sector – for instance Ipsos Mori’s survey 
of over 1000 people (2012) found that 70% of those who mention it as a change being 
made to the NHS believe it will make services worse for patients (up 10 percentage 
points from December 2011) and Gettleson’s on-line survey of 2,200 respondents 
(2011) found that 71% opposed (and 7% supported) a ‘full privatisation’ of the NHS. 
Asked about the move to give patients choice of provider from any sector (i.e. 
removing the public sector monopoly) the numbers were a lot closer however, with 
31% in support and 38% opposed. Similarly a Populus (2011) survey reports that 74% 
agreed that ‘the most important thing is to have high quality, free, public services - 
not who is involved behind the scenes in running them’. Wellings et al (2011) write 
that two in five do not mind who provides health services as long as they are free of 
charge, although some surveys report that the public are wary of the ‘profit motive’. 
This rather mixed picture suggests that the public appear to reject ‘full privatisation’. 
However, this is not defined, and they appear to be against ‘commodification’ 
(charging) more than plurality of supply. In other words, public views on 
‘privatisation’ may vary on different types of the term and indeed on how survey 
questions are phrased (cf Dean 2001). 
 
Clinical Perspectives 
 
Two of the most prominent professional bodies are the British Medical Association 
(BMA) and the Royal College of Nursing (RCN).  Both act as trade unions and 
representative bodies and were in existence long before the NHS (and therefore 
concerns regarding privatisation) was created (175 and 97 years respectively). Whilst 
much of their membership is drawn from public sector employees, there are also a 
significant proportion of nurses who workin the independent sector,andconsultants 
who undertake private work alongside their NHS duties. Furthermore   GPs, who are 
the traditional ‘backbone’ of the BMA, effectively work as self-employed 
independent contractors to the NHS.   
Whilst the RCN describe itself as not ‘ideologically opposed’ to involvement of the 
private sector in the NHS, it does not support (undefined) ‘whole scale privatisation’ 
(RCN 2007). It remains ‘strongly committed’ to a ‘publicly funded services which is 
free at the point of delivery’ (RCN 2012), which is rather similar to the government’s 
stated position. It states a pragmatic or evidence-based rather than an ideological 
opposition, using the example of ISTC as an example of ‘contracting out’ to the 
private sector which is not working in practice.   
 
The BMA has been more vocal in its opposition to increased private sector 
involvement (Timmins 2012). Its ‘Caring for the NHS’ initiative in 2008 involved 
leaflets being delivered to every GP practice in England which stressed the 
importance of public health care services being funded through general taxation (the 
top row of the MEW). In the accompanying policy statement it saw only a 
‘peripheral’ role for private sector provision and this view was reinstated in the 
response to the current changes (BMA 2010). Once again there is no clear definition 
of what constitutes ‘peripheral’. Moreover, there is a refusal to recognise that GPs 
have been de facto ‘private sector providers’ since 1948.   
 
The dual role of these organisations gives rise to some problems in specifying 
organisational interests. Arguments against privatization are often made with respect 
to protecting standards in a public service, but critics claim this may be hiding self-
interest in the form of maintaining national pay deals, avoiding competition, and 
blocking change.  
       
Campaigning Group Perspectives 
 
Such is the strength of passion for a ‘public’ NHS that a number of campaigning 
groups have arisen to protest against any further ‘privatization’. These include ‘Keep 
Our NHS Public’ (KONP) (a ‘grass roots coalition’ of ‘medical professionals’, 
unions, user groups and ‘concerned citizens’), the NHS Support Federation (NSF) 
(drawn ‘equally’ from ‘health professionals’ and the ‘general public) and National 
Health Action (NHA) (a new political party launched by doctors with a manifesto to 
specifically challenge ‘privatization’). KONP (2012) describe private sector 
involvement as ‘destabilising in the short-term and highly damaging in the long-term’ 
due to a ‘fragmentation’ of the risk-pool, ‘marketization’ in which providers 
maximise profit through payment for activity mechanisms, and ‘disintegration’ of the 
current public provision. They also raise concerns regarding a loss both of public 
accountability and interest in preventative measures. Under the banner of ‘private 
sector involvement’ they incorporate not only who funds and delivers but also the 
payment mechanisms and how these might influence all providers, including NHS.  
The MEW is not of use in this regard as such mechanisms are not traditionally 
considered in its three dimensions.  
 
NSF also take a holistic view of ‘privatisation’ that incorporates the removal of the 
‘income cap’ for NHS providers outline above and franchising of the management of 
NHS resources (NSF 2012). Both NSF and KONP include a greater role for not-for 
profit providers under the banner of privatisation, with concerns that whilst this would 
‘hike up’ administration costs and reduce flexibility available to commissioners (as in 
their view external services would only work to the letter of their contract whereas 
internal provision are seen as being more responsive). This includes charities, which 
under English law must be set up for ‘public benefit’ and be overseen by volunteer 
trustees who do not receive financial reward from the organisation. NSF view one of 
the UK’s largest health charities as operating as ‘any other corporate entity’ despite 
reinvesting all their profits back into patient services. This suggests an interpretation 
of ‘private’ that is essentially anything other than those services traditionally run by 
and contracted with the NHS and therefore outside of MEW Cell 1. Once again GPs 
are not included in the private sector, with their surplus being described as a ‘salary’ 
rather than as ‘profits’ (KONP 2012). 
 
An Irregular Verb? 
 
As expected, applying the MEW highlights that there is not a commonly used 
definition of ‘privatization’ among the stakeholders, and they will adapt and bend the 
definition depending on their starting point and assumptions Second, there are some 
protests against (an undefined) ‘full’ privatization when it is unlikely that this is an 
option (cf Timmins 2012: 99). For some, the issue appears to be over principle, but 
for others it is more about pragmatism or evidence (although the evidence is 
sometimes flawed or absent).  The ‘bottom line’ appears to be the ‘free at the point of 
use’ principle (ie cell 14 commodification) for some, although the NHS has arguably 
never been fully free at the point of use. For others, the issue appears to be one of 
degree rather than principle, but it is unclear where the ‘line’ should be drawn. For 
example, there was heady talk during the Labour government that 15% or more of 
NHS waiting-list type treatments could one day be provided by the private sector, 
although the proportion in fact has yet to reach 5% (Timmins 2012). There is no clear 
explanation of why, say, a Trust could receive 30% but not 49% of its income from 
private patients. Finally, there seems to be some ‘forgotten pasts’ or ‘dogs that did not 
bark’ as Labour politicians attempt to avoid past ‘privatizations’ that they have 
introduced and some ‘independent contractors’ are seen as more equal than others. In 
terms of grammar, ‘privatize’ seems to be an irregular verb: I want more private 
sector involvement; you wish to privatise the NHS. 
 
 
The term “privatization” is multi-dimensional, and definitions and operationalizations 
of the term are often implicit, unclear and conflicting, resulting in conflicting accounts 
of the occurrence, chronology and degree of privatization in the NHS. Stakeholders 
have divergent interests, and they use “privatization” as a means to express them. 
Unfortunately, the result is a tower of babel.  
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Table 1  The Mixed Economy of Welfare in the British NHS 
 
 State provision 
 
Market Provision Voluntary Provision Informal Provision 
State 
Finance  
 
(1) 
NHS Hospitals (1) 
General Practitioners (1-
4)? 
NHS Trusts (2) 
Foundation Trusts? (3-4) 
CHI/ HCC/ CQC (High 
regulation) (3-4) 
(High regulation) Monitor 
(H) (3-4) 
 
(2) 
General Practitioners (1-4)? 
Hospital Cleaning (2-4) 
Independent Sector Treatment Centres 
(3-4) 
Contracting with private hospitals (2-4) 
Private Finance Initiative (2-4) 
Private Consultancies (3-4) 
Tendering of management of NHS 
Trust management (3-4) 
(3) 
Contracting with mental health 
charities (1-4) 
Foundation Trusts? (3-4) 
Right to Request (3-4); 
AWP / AQP (3-4) 
Hospices (2-4) 
 
(4) 
Personal health budgets (3-4) 
Market 
Finance 
(5) 
Private health beds in 
NHS Hospitals (1-4) 
 
(6) 
Private health care funded by private 
insurance (1-4) 
(7) (8) 
Voluntary 
Finance 
(9) 
 
(10) (11) 
Hospices (2-4) 
 
(12) 
Informal 
Finance 
(13) 
Pay beds in NHS 
Hospitals(1-4) 
(14) 
Prescription charges (1-4);  
Spectacles (1-4) 
Dental examination (2-4); 
Optical examination (2-4); 
OTC Medicines (1-4); 
Private medicine (1-4);  
(15) (16) 
 
 
 
Periods: ‘Classic NHS’ (1948-79) = 1; Conservative (1979-1997) = 2; New Labour (1997-2010) = 3; Coalition (2010-) = 4.  
 
